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Abstract 
This article will consider whether the current common law defence of insanity is 
ineffective and in need of reform. It will do so by contemplating several criticisms of 
the insanity defence arising from the M’Naghten Rules and examine some 
recommended changes to the law this area. 
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Introduction 
The concept of insanity as a defence was established in the early the eighteenth 
century by Arnold’s Case. Tracy J established that: 
[A] man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth 
not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild 
beast, such a one is never the object of punishment.2  
 
Although the concept of legal insanity was further developed in the late eighteenth 
century in Hadfield,3 the standard test of criminal liability in relation to mentally 
disordered defendants in common law was only formed after the case of M’Naghten.4 
This case accepted the previous principles and established that a special verdict of 
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‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ (NGRI) should be delivered whenever there is 
evidence of total lack of ‘understanding and memory due to a morbid inherent 
condition of the brain.’5 
 
Over the years, academics have identified many conspicuous flaws and uncertainties 
surrounding the insanity defence. First, the out-dated terminology of the M’Naghten 
Rules is considered a significant drawback. At present, the rules cover miscellaneous 
crimes in England and Wales, including non-mental illnesses and conditions such as 
epilepsy, diabetes and sleepwalking. Consequently, many argue that the insanity 
defence has ‘lost much of its raison d’être.'6  
 
The fact that the statutory definition of mental disorder under s1 of the Mental Health 
Act (MHA) 1983 – amended by the MHA 2007 – has not always been consistent with 
the legal concept of ‘disease of the mind’ under the M’Naghten Rules further 
exacerbates matters. The concept of ‘disease of the mind’ is far-fetched and includes 
non-mental bodily diseases under medical terms; this problem was initially apparent 
in the case of Kemp7. Currently, a person suffering from severe mental disorder, such 
as psychopaths, may not always fall under the scope of insanity. 
 
In murder cases, most defendants prefer to seek alternative defences such as 
diminished responsibility and non-insane automatism. It may also be difficult to 
determine whether the defence is of insane or non-insane automatism, which further 
attenuates the shaky grounds of the insanity defence. Article 5(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) protects the right to liberty and security of 
person. However, Article 5(1)(e) allows the lawful detention of persons of unsound 
mind. People who suffer from epilepsy or diabetes can still fall under the M’Naghten 
Rules; this contradicts Article 5(1)(e), because the English and Welsh courts accept 
that these defendants are of unsound mind when they are not. The aforementioned 
issues portray the insanity defence as weak and in need of reform. This article will 
consider these, as well as recommendations for reform of the insanity defence.  
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1 Insufficiencies of the M’Naghten rules 
 
The M’Naghten Rules 
On January 20 1843, Daniel M’Naghten shot Edward Drummond, who died on April 
25th. M’Naghten was suffering from morbid delusions at the time of the shooting. The 
House of Lords contemplated the nature and extent of the unsoundness of mind 
which would excuse the commission of a felony on the 6th and 13th March 1843.8 
The judges were responsible for guiding the jury on what kind and degree of insanity 
would constitute a defence.9 The court established that a defence on the ground of 
insanity could only be raised after the accused had proven that, at the time of the 
crime, he or she was suffering such a defect of reason (from disease of the mind) as 
not to know the nature and quality of his or her action or, if he did know it, that he 
was unable to distinguish its wrongfulness.  
 
The question of moral responsibility 
M'Naghten was decided when the law was still at a rudimentary stage.10 Today, the 
rules set out in the case face many criticisms, the major one being that the second 
limb of the M’Naghten Rules – a defendant did not know ‘he was doing what was 
wrong’ – only covers ‘wrong’ in the legal sense and does not encompass moral 
wrongness, which many have argued makes the second limb insufficient.11 This 
problem was exposed in R v Windle,12 where a strict approach was taken towards the 
wrongness limb.13 In that case, the defendant killed his suicidal wife by giving her a 
dose of some 100 aspirin tablets. When he was arrested, he told ‘the police that he 
supposed he would be hanged for it.’14 Lord Goddard described the defendant’s 
psychiatric condition as ‘a form of communicated insanity known as folie à deux.’15 
Nevertheless, he ruled that a man suffering from a defect of reason may still be liable 
if he knew that what he was doing was contrary to law.16 This principle was also 
followed in Johnson,17 where the trial judge withdrew the insanity defence from the 
jury. Psychiatrists in Windle agreed that at the time of the offence, the defendant 
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knew that what he had done was against the law – despite the fact that one of the 
psychiatrists considered that the defendant did not know that his actions were 
morally wrong, a factor which was disregarded.  
 
Doubt has been cast on the principle set out in Windle in a number of overseas 
jurisdictions.18 In Stapleton,19 the High Court of Australia concluded that Windle was 
wrongly decided as the question was whether the defendant knew that he was wrong 
according to the ordinary principles of reasonable men rather than wrong as being 
contrary to law. In Chaulk,20 the Supreme Court of Canada stressed that ‘wrong’ must 
mean more than just legally wrong.21 The court established that a person suffering 
from a disease of the mind may know that it is legally wrong to kill but he may still kill 
‘in the belief that it is in response to a divine order and therefore not morally wrong.’22 
The question of whether such people should be exempted from criminal responsibility 
has been raised by academics. Howard links criminal responsibility and irrationality in 
terms of conduct, emotions and attitude,23 arguing that in order to be labelled insane, 
a person should act irrationally due to a defect in his 'autonomous working mind.’24 
He also supports the argument espoused by Moore that only individuals who can 
appreciate moral principles can be seen as rational and only rational moral agents 
can be responsible in law.25  
 
The wide scope of ‘disease of the mind’ 
The concept of ‘disease of the mind’ is not totally compatible with the statutory 
definition of mental disorder under the MHA 1983. The MHA focuses on facilitating 
treatment of serious mental disorder, whereas the insanity defence aims to excuse 
criminal responsibility of mentally disordered defendants.26 Over the years, disease of 
the mind has had diverse interpretations. In Kemp,27 the defendant hit his wife with a 
hammer while suffering from arteriosclerosis. Although the defendant raised non-
insane automatism as a defence, Devlin J directed the jury to the insanity defence. 
He held that hardening of the arteries was capable of a temporary or permanent 
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defect in the mind, and was therefore a ‘disease of the mind’ within the scope of the 
M'Naghten Rules. The court established that ‘disease of the mind’ did not distinguish 
between diseases of the mind and body, rather it was there to prevent the phrase 
‘defect of reason’ from including defect of reasoning caused simply by brutish 
stupidity without rational power. Devlin J further explained that ‘there is... no general 
medical opinion upon what category of diseases are properly to be called diseases of 
the mind.’28 
 
The fact that the courts use the phrase ‘disease of the mind’ unrestrictedly was 
further apparent when defendants suffering from epilepsy and diabetes were covered 
by the M’Naghten Rules. In Bratty,29 the defendant strangled an 18 year-old girl. 
Medical practitioners submitted that the defendant was probably suffering from 
psychomotor epilepsy and, if he was, it was a defect of reason due to disease of the 
mind. The judges accepted this view and stated that only the insanity defence was 
available to the defendant. Lord Denning reasoned that ‘any mental disorder which 
has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease of the mind.’30 
 
In Sullivan,31 the defendant was suffering from a seizure due to psychomotor 
epilepsy when he kicked a man in the head and body. He was charged with inflicting 
grievous bodily harm with intent. Medical professionals claimed that Sullivan was 
suffering from the third, or post-ictal, stage of the seizure, in which he was 
unconscious and unable to control his movements. The defence put forward non-
insane automatism, arguing that the defendant had acted unconsciously and 
involuntarily in kicking the victim and was therefore not insane. However, since the 
defendant’s seizure was marked by ‘the discharge of electrical impulses into the 
brain which had reacted on centres controlling its functions, one of which is 
memory’,32 psychomotor epilepsy was classified as a disease of the mind. The ‘mind’ 
of the M'Naghten Rules was used in the ordinary sense of the mental faculties of 
reason, memory and understanding; the court stated: 
 
It matters not whether the aetiology, of the impairment is organic, as in epilepsy, or 
functional, or whether the impairment itself is permanent or is transient and 
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intermittent, provided that it subsisted at the time of commission of the act33 The 
judges directed the jury to deliver a special verdict of NGRI instead. Not wanting to 
be labelled insane, Sullivan changed his plea to guilty of assault occasioning actual 
bodily harm. He then appealed on the basis that the judge should have left the 
defence of non-insane automatism to the jury. Although the appeal was allowed, the 
previous decision was upheld. In Sullivan, the court further widened the scope of 
disease of the mind by differing from Bratty and establishing that it was neither 
necessary for a mental disorder to be prone to recur nor manifest itself in violence.  
 
During the appeal, defence counsel argued that insanity only covered defective 
reasoning and defective intellect, which did not include the absence of reasoning or 
intellect and in medical terms, epilepsy was not a disease of the mind. It was also 
argued that it could not be said that the defendant did not know the nature and 
quality of the act when he did not even know that he was acting in anyway. It was the 
seizures that were unwillingly moving him, and his actions were a result of muscular 
spasm, uncontrolled by his brain. Contrary to the defence counsel’s argument, 
Lawton LJ found that there may be a defect of reason whether or not reason has 
been suspended, stating ‘one cannot distinguish between suspension of reason and 
maloperation.’34 Lord Diplock also defended the M’Naghten Rules by claiming that 
the jurors of the 1980s would understand the first limb to mean that ‘he did not know 
what he was doing.’35 Nevertheless, the court did acknowledge the unfair effects of 
the M’Naghten Rules, stating that ‘it is an offence to common sense and sensibilities 
to dub as insane a sufferer from psychomotor epileptic seizures.’36  
 
Today, the insanity defence includes psychiatric and neurological conditions as well 
as purely physical disorders like diabetes.37 In Hennessy,38 the defendant was 
charged with taking a motor vehicle without consent. He was suffering from 
hyperglycaemia resulting from a failure to take his insulin for two or three days, due 
to depression and stress. It was held that hyperglycaemia caused by high blood 
sugar levels was an internal factor, therefore an inherent defect that was a disease of 
the mind.39 The case of Quick40 can be distinguished from Hennessey, although the 
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defendant in Quick was also a diabetic. The defendant was a nurse who attacked a 
patient and inflicted actual bodily harm while in a hypoglycaemic state. He had not 
eaten a sufficient amount of food to neutralise the injected insulin, consuming alcohol 
instead. This was seen as an external factor, and therefore it was not a disease of 
the mind: the defendant had been reckless. He consumed alcohol when he was 
medically advised not to. He knew the possible consequences and therefore could 
not be exempted from criminal liability. The court concluded that he could not rely on 
non-insane automatism, but he did not have to plead insanity.   
 
As such, someone who neglects their condition by not eating properly may be 
acquitted by reason of non-insane automatism, whereas someone who neglects their 
condition by not injecting insulin may be found NGRI,41 even though both may have 
acted in the same way with the same state of mind.42 The distinction seems bizarre 
and unfair; the unsatisfactory nature of the law in the area of insanity is apparent.43 
Rumbold has found that arrests of diabetics suffering from hypoglycaemia occur 
regularly.44 For instance, in Davies,45 a lorry driver killed three people in an accident 
due to hypoglycaemia. It was found that he had been involved in a similar accident 
six years ago. This raises the question of to what extent the justification for the 
varying conviction rules is viable when people suffering from hypoglycaemia are just 
as likely to be dangerous to the public as people suffering from hyperglycaemia.  
 
Psychopathy 
Within the scope of disease of the mind, serious mental disorder does not 
necessarily negate responsibility.46 There have been legal debates about 
psychopathy being a mental disorder, with some defining mental disorder as ‘the 
harmful impairment of rational capacities.’47 Emotional abilities which are involved in 
practical reasoning, such as the capacity to appreciate moral and immoral values, 
are also included. Psychopaths are seen as lacking this capacity, which as a result 
may cut them off from the evaluative human instincts. This definition may encompass 
psychopathy as a mental disorder; however, the Criminal Justice and Licensing 
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(Scotland) Bill has described psychopathy as ‘a personality disorder which is 
characterised solely or principally by abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible 
conduct.’48 The definition is therefore purely criminal rather than medical;49 it does not 
allow psychopaths to avoid criminal liability. Scottish Law excluded psychopathy from 
mental non-responsibility and justified it on the basis that psychopathy is a volitional 
disorder that does not eliminate self-control.50 Volitional disorder may not fall under 
the M’Naghten Rules because it is presumed that psychopaths know the nature and 
wrongfulness of a criminal conduct.51 However, the fact that ‘psychopathy can indeed 
impair cognitive abilities’52 – which as a result may give rise to a defect of reason and 
hinder their ability to appreciate the nature, quality and the wrongfulness of the act – 
is disregarded. 
 
The Institute of Psychiatry at King’s College, London carried out a study that 
compared the brain anatomy of nine diagnosed psychopaths to that of a controlled 
ordinary group of people.53 Brain regions concerned with emotional responses, such 
as the amygdala, and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), involved with higher decision 
making of the diagnosed psychopaths, were found to have greater abnormality. 
Hence, it was established that there was a connection between specific brain regions 
and psychopathy.54 Psychopathy was consequently purported as a mental disorder; 
however, it does not fall under the insanity defence.55 It was established in Kemp that 
the law is concerned with the mind (the mental faculties of reason, memory and 
understanding) rather than the brain. It may be contested that an abnormality of the 
brain, such as the study refers to, may have the capacity to affect the mental faculties 
of reason, memory and understanding, and therefore prevent the person from 
apprehending the nature and quality of the act and its wrongfulness. For instance, it 
has been asserted that psychopaths lack emotional empathy therefore they may be 
less scrupulous after conducting unlawful action. Therefore, a psychopath may 
naturally disregard the nature, quality and wrongfulness of an act.56 The other 
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important question to consider is, ‘should psychopaths be able to avoid punishment 
and criminal responsibility due to their cognitive deficiencies, since it would defeat the 
purpose of a safer society’? Elliott has suggested that without the understanding of 
morality and empathy, one cannot be held responsible for one's offenses.57 However, 
in many cases this notion has caused public outrage. For instance, in McMilan,58 the 
defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment after pleading guilty to the 
manslaughter of Shirley Cotton-Betteridge. The victim’s parents questioned the legal 
system for not isolating the defendant from the community when he was already 
seen as a highly dangerous sex offender.59 Some argue that psychopaths do not act 
out of ignorance and in fact they freely do ‘morally reprehensible’ deeds, and should 
be blameworthy and criminally liable.60 Also, psychopaths may commit unlawful 
actions even if they know what they are doing is wrong, suggesting that it may be 
right to hold psychopaths criminally liable. Can psychopathy be included in the 
insanity defence? If it can, would it be fair to relieve them from criminal responsibility? 
This dilemma further undermines the credibility of the insanity defence in its current 
state. 
 
2 Is the Defence of Insanity Actually Desired? 
 
Reluctance of defendants to plead insanity 
The scant use of the insanity defence represents its ineffectiveness. There were only 
15 findings of not guilty but insane in 2001.61 The death penalty has long been 
abolished in the UK, therefore most defendants do not choose to rely on the insanity 
defence, especially when there are other defences that have more favourable 
outcomes. In England and Wales, it is rare that a defendant will choose to plead 
insanity if he is charged with murder since serving a finite sentence is seen as more 
favourable. Research shows that the plea of insanity increased after the Criminal 
Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, in which the forms of disposal 
were expanded from just indefinite and indeterminate hospitalisation – as was the 
case under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 – to the court attaining 
discretion (except in murder charges). Mackay summarised the changes as follows: 
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To order admission to hospital without the equivalent of restrictions; or make 
a guardianship order under the Mental Health Act 1983, or a supervision and 
treatment order, or an order for an absolute discharge of the accused.62 
 
However, such an increase has not been so apparent in murder cases. Mackay 
found that under the 1964 Act, murder had accounted for almost one third of the 
cases,63 but this reduced to only four cases (9.1%), after the first five years of the 
1991 Act and to seven cases (9.7%) in 2006.64 The automatic restriction order that 
results from an NGRI verdict for murder stands as a major disincentive.65 
 
Diminished responsibility  
The insanity defence goes hand in hand with the defence of diminished responsibility 
under s52 Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Similar to the phrase ‘disease of the mind’ 
under the M’Naghten Rules, the phrase ‘recognised medical condition’ is used for 
diminished responsibility. It is capable of encompassing all relevant mental disorders, 
including both ‘psychological’ and ‘physical” conditions’.66 As a result, it includes 
conditions like epilepsy, sleeping disorders and diabetes; this means that if a 
defendant’s abnormality of functioning was a result of such medical conditions and 
led him or her killing someone, they might prefer the partial defence of diminished 
responsibility – and be convicted for manslaughter rather than be detained in a 
mental institute indefinitely. Some grounds of diminished responsibility are very 
similar to the insanity defence; for instance, s52(1A)(a) states that the defendant 
must ‘not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing’. Indeed, statistics 
have shown that there were higher numbers of defendants relying on diminished 
responsibility than the insanity defence. In 2005, diminished responsibility was the 
basis of 39 cases and there were 19 convictions in 2005/06 for manslaughter on the 
grounds of diminished responsibility.67 This number is much higher than Mackay’s 
findings of defendants pleading insanity to a charge of murder. 
 
However, the scope of diminished responsibility has become narrower. In order to 
satisfy the M'Naghten Rules, the only necessary requirement is that a ‘disease of the 
mind’ causes ‘a defect of reason’.68 There is no additional need to prove that the 
‘disease of the mind’ caused or was a significant contributory factor in causing the 
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defendant to carry out his conduct, which is necessary under s52(1B), where an 
abnormality of mental functioning should provide an explanation for the defendant’s 
conduct. Diminished responsibility states that the partial defence will fail if the jury 
believes that the defendant ‘would have killed anyway and the impairment would not 
have affected their behaviour during the killing.’69 Hence, it may be more plausible for 
the defendants to rely on the insanity defence. For instance, if a defendant’s mental 
state during unlawful conduct satisfies all the elements of both pleas but not the 
causal requirement, then it is more likely that he will succeed under the insanity 
defence.70  
 
Non-insane Automatism 
In most cases, it is also possible to raise an alternative defence of sane automatism 
while insane automatism is being raised. In the case of Charlson,71 the defendant hit 
his 10 year-old son on the head with a hammer and threw him into a river. He was 
charged with causing grievous bodily harm with intent, and with unlawful wounding. 
The evidence pointed to the possibility that Charlson was suffering from a cerebral 
tumour, which had caused ‘a motiveless outburst of impulsive violence’72 over which 
he had no control. The insanity defence was not raised and the defence of non-
insane automatism was raised instead. Barry J directed the jury that ‘if he did not 
know what he was doing, if his actions were purely automatic and his mind had no 
control over the movement of his limbs’73 then the proper verdict is 'Not Guilty’. In 
Bratty,74 automatism was defined as the state of a person who, although capable of 
action, was not conscious of what he was doing (an unconscious involuntary action), 
which therefore is a defence because the mind is not in sync with what is being 
done.75 In Hill v Baxter,76 Devlin J ruled that if the cause was not a disease of the 
mind and was merely the result of a temporary loss of consciousness arising 
accidentally, then it would be reasonable to hope that it will not be repeated and it 
would be safe to acquit the defendant.77 This outcome resulting from a defence of 
non-insane automatism is certainly an attractive alternative. As such, defendants 
choose to first rely on this defence rather than insanity when their case is likely to 
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satisfy either one of the three elements: it is an external cause, an unconscious 
action or self-induced automatism.  
 
Few cases have exposed the difficulty of separating a cause as internal or external, 
evidently blurring the line between sane and insane automatism. This was apparent 
in the case of T,78 where the court contemplated the question of whether post-
traumatic stress resulting from the defendant being raped was an external or internal 
factor. Conflicting psychiatric opinions may also make it difficult to differentiate. For 
instance, in Wiseman,79 a psychiatrist called by the defence testified that an accused 
charged with the murder of her two children had committed the killings in a 
‘dissociative state’. He maintained that a series of shattering emotional experiences 
had led her to take unconscious involuntary actions. However, two other psychiatrists 
gave evidence suggestive of insanity. Such cases may arise when there is evidence 
that points to a disease of the mind, insanity, and sane automatism. Consequently, it 
may be difficult to classify what particular factors are ‘responsible for the alleged 
involuntariness’80 and this further questions the equivocal premises of the insanity 
defence.  
 
Article 5(1)(e) and persons who suffer from epilepsy and diabetes 
Article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR offers broad possibilities to detain a variety of different 
groups without the need for conviction of a criminal offence.81 The court must 
consider the conditions set out by Winterwerp,82 in order to determine whether the 
detention of the groups mentioned under Article 5(1)(e) is justified or not. In 
Winterwerp, the Strasbourg Court held that the domestic law relating to the detention 
of persons under Article 5(1)(e) must conform to three criteria:  
(1) a true mental disorder must be established before a competent authority 
on the basis of objective medical expertise; (2) the mental disorder must be of 
a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement; and (3) the validity of 
the patient's continued detention depends upon the persistence of such a 
disorder. As to (2), Member States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation, for 
example as to whether to allow detention of people who are not dangerous to 
self or to others.83  
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Under the original ‘admission orders’ of the 1991 Act, hospitalisation of those who 
were not mentally disordered was permitted if they were found NGRI or unfit to plead. 
This can be seen as inconsistent with Article 5(1)(e). People suffering from epilepsy 
or diabetes who are covered by the M’Naghten Rules do not satisfy all the criteria in 
Winterwerp. They are not actually suffering from a mental disorder because the 
medical definition of mental disorder does not include people suffering from such 
diseases. The fact that the English and Welsh system puts people with such 
conditions in the same category as criminals like serial killers or psychopaths seems 
quite unfair. This was asserted by critics, who claim that ‘the current law unfairly 
encompasses medical conditions such as epilepsy, which affects nearly half a million 
people in Britain.’84 
 
However, the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 was introduced in 
order to make amendments to the 1991 Act. Sections 24 and 5A of the 2004 Act 
certified that there must be medical evidence which could justify detention in hospital 
on the grounds of the defendant's mental state, namely a mental disorder within the 
MHA 1983 before a hospital or restriction order can be made even in consideration of 
murder charges.85 Hence, such an Act is a step towards protecting minority groups 
like diabetics and epileptics. 
 
3 Possible reforms 
This article has outlined significant weaknesses in the insanity defence; 
unsurprisingly there have been attempts to amend it. The Butler Committee on 
Mentally Abnormal Offenders proposed a new verdict of ‘not guilty by reason of 
mental disorder’ in 1975. The Committee recommended that the defence should be 
available where mental disorder negated the requisite mens rea for an offence and 
where the defendant was suffering from severe mental disorder at the time of his 
actions.86 The proposal, if accepted, would have included psychopathy and no longer 
label epileptics or diabetics as insane, perhaps easing the reluctance of minority 
groups to utilize such a defence. The Committee held that causality between the 
mental disorder and conduct should remain so that psychiatrists could only state 
facts without deciding on criminal responsibility.87 A clear, clinical description of facts 
would supposedly prevent juries from confusing medical definitions of mental illness 
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with conditions which excuse defendants from responsibility. For instance, clause 
35(2) of the Draft Criminal Code allows the prosecution to show whether the offence 
was attributable to the disorder or not, and in the cases of defendants not knowing 
that the conduct was morally wrong, the inability should be to such an extent as to 
render the defendant permanently unable to form a moral dialogue.88 It also outlines 
what should be included under the scope of 'severe and permanent mental 
condition'.89 
 
Slobogin has proposed 'an intermediate position', a partial abolition of the defence, 
which would allow a defendant suffering from a mental disorder to use the disorder in 
support of his claim for a defence of duress, self-defence or absence of mens rea.90 
For instance, if a defendant mistakenly believes that he will be killed if he does not 
act in a certain way due to a mental disorder, he should be entitled to a defence of 
duress rather than insanity. The defendants should be directed to other defences if 
possible. This is the case in most murder charges, where defendants voluntarily 
choose to rely on defences other than insanity. Hence, perhaps such a partial 
abolition could work.  
 
Howard suggests that the insanity defence should be based on an actor’s irrationality 
and his capacity to be a moral agent. Then, the medical evidence should be used to 
establish whether the defendant’s condition hindered him from being rational. 
Slobogin states that perhaps a rationality test could be formed which would include 
compulsion if it gives the basis for an individual’s irrationality.91 Fingarette further 
proposes that the rationality notion could include cognitive and volitional criteria.92 It 
cannot be stated that the aforementioned reform strategies are perfect, but they do 
try to improve the insanity defence. Lastly, courts should have more discretion over 
deciding what category of people are seen as dangerous, and measures should be 
imposed on that particular group accordingly rather than applying strict measures 
towards everyone.93 
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Conclusion  
The ‘exceptional and incongruous position of the defence of insanity’94 has led to 
many criticisms of the M’Naghten Rules. The rules include epileptics and diabetics, 
but not the people who think what they do is morally right but legally wrong, as well 
as psychopaths who probably should be deemed as insane. The flexibility of disposal 
created by the 1991 Act has made the insanity defence more adaptable and 
approachable;95,however, the fact that many are still reluctant to use the defence 
indicates that perhaps the defence should be used in exceptional cases only. Also, 
the fact that some may still support the judgment of Wilson J in Chaulk – who stated 
that it is better for a guilty person to be found insane than an insane person be 
convicted of a crime – makes the notion of abolishing the insanity defence 
unacceptable. It cannot be denied that it is difficult to determine the level of mental 
abnormality that ought to confer a status exemption, but it is really up to Parliament 
to decide on whether any reforms should be introduced or not.96 Again, as long as 
both courts and Parliament hold that it is more important to protect the community 
from dangerous individuals than protect the rights of a small group of defendants,97 
the insanity defence will continue to exist even with inadequacies.  
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